Mandatory Regionalization and Its Limits: How California Districts Experience and Navigate Special Education Governance

This report provides evidence on how California’s SELPAs serve important administrative, compliance, and service-coordination roles that are only partially visible in current reporting. It identifies substantial variation in SELPA spending and supports, pointing to policy changes that could strengthen transparency, accountability, and equitable access to regional special education services.

This study examines how California governs special education through regional educational services agencies called special education local plan areas (SELPAs). Special education governance is the coordination, funding, and oversight of services across state, regional, and local educational agencies under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Most U.S. local educational agencies (LEAs) participate in regional service arrangements to access specialized programs (Doutre et al., 2021b; Stephens & Keane, 2005). California has a unique regional model where membership is mandatory and SELPAs administer special education funding across groups of LEAs. Examining SELPAs provides a case for understanding the benefits and limitations of mandatory regional governance in special education. 

Special education spending in California has more than doubled since 2004–05 and now represents roughly 20 percent of total student spending (Bruno, 2026). A series of state and independent reports have raised concerns about transparency, equity, and accountability in how SELPAs allocate resources among member LEAs (Doutre et al., 2021a; Doutre et al., 2021b; Hill et al., 2016; Warren & Hill, 2018). Central to these concerns is California's distinctive funding structure. State and federal special education dollars flow to SELPAs rather than directly to LEAs. SELPA administrators and governing boards, composed of member LEA superintendents or their designees, determine how these funds are divided between regional operations and allocations to individual LEAs. This arrangement distinguishes California from other states, where special education funds flow directly to LEAs, which may participate in voluntary resource-sharing consortia (Doutre et al., 2021a; Doutre et al., 2021b). Prior reports questioned whether all LEAs benefited equitably from SELPAs, whether SELPA administrative costs were justified by the value of services provided, and whether LEAs had meaningful voice in SELPA governance (Hill et al., 2016;Doutre et al., 2021a; Doutre et al., 2021b; Doutre et al., 2021c).

Through a mixed-methods case study drawing on newly standardized SELPA financial data from 2024–25 and interviews with a stratified sample of LEA special education administrators, this study examines three questions:

  1. How do SELPAs allocate special education funds between regionalized coordination functions and direct LEA allocations, and how does this vary across SELPA types? 
  2. What governance functions do LEA special education administrators identify as the primary value of regional cost sharing, and how consistently are these functions performed across SELPAs? 
  3. How do LEAs construct alternative governance arrangements when SELPA coordination capacity is insufficient or misaligned with local needs?

We document that SELPAs support a range of regionalized functions—including data reporting, alternative dispute resolution, and specialized programs—and that total SELPA-level expenditures substantially exceed the state funding allocated for regionalized operations. Because these expenditures reflect both administrative functions and shared service provision, they cannot be directly mapped onto specific activities unless a SELPA chooses to provide that level and type of detail within the open response section of the CDE template. As a result, the state lacks visibility into how much is spent on SELPA administration versus service delivery, as well as the extent and nature of services LEAs receive across regions. In interviews we observe substantial variation across SELPAs in the services and support provided to LEAs. In response, LEAs develop parallel cost-sharing arrangements outside SELPA structures and may be exposed to legal liabilities when SELPA supports are insufficient or misaligned with local needs. Our findings point to potential policy adjustments that might improve quality and consistency within California’s special education governance system and guide other states seeking to regionalize special education services (e.g., Center for Learner Equity, 2024).

The paper proceeds as follows: we review relevant concepts and prior research, describe the case of California’s SELPA system, present data and methods, report findings, and conclude with policy implications. The empirical contribution of this study is descriptive: it documents the fiscal scale of SELPA regionalized operations and examines how LEA administrators interpret the coordination functions associated with those expenditures.